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At a recent debate in Washington about the rise of China, a U.S. career dipl
At a recent debate in Washington about the rise of China, a U.S. career dipl
游客
2025-01-18
35
管理
问题
At a recent debate in Washington about the rise of China, a U.S. career diplomat struck an optimistic note. Yes, China would probably soon overtake the United States as the world’s largest economy, he conceded, but the Middle Kingdom was unlikely to rival the United States anytime soon when it came to "soft power", or cultural influence and attractiveness.
Indeed, soft power is generally seen as a major asset in the foreign policy realm, helping countries achieve their goals without resorting to "hard power"—i.e.,
coercive
means. "Young people around the world," the diplomat confidently asserted, "still listen to American music, watch American movies and dream of coming to the United States."
Particularly in Latin America, that remains as true as ever, despite Donald Trump in the White House and a historic and irreversible shift of economic power away from the West towards Asia. The United States’ cultural influence and visibility stands unrivaled across Latin America. Chinese culture, by comparison, remains largely unknown and is usually met with indifference and a lack of interest. While some people are aware of China’s growing economic role in Latin America—it is already the largest trading partner of several of the region’s major economies, including Brazil, Chile and Peru—most would struggle to name a single Chinese contemporary singer, athlete or soap opera star. Latin America’s mass media busily reports even minor events in U.S. politics or cultural life, yet Chinese news remain the stuff of specialists.
Yet while U.S. soft power may provide some tangible economic benefits in Latin America—think of tourism to Disney World and New York, Netflix subscriptions and Starbucks sales—it has also shown to be a double-edged sword, particularly in the foreign policy realm. China’s
under-the-radar
approach in Latin America, by comparison, also brings important advantages, some of which may, paradoxically, be of greater strategic relevance in the long term. That is because, in a region traditionally concerned about U.S. meddling, strong cultural influence tends to inflate the perceived political and economic influence. While the United States’ de facto influence in Latin America has declined significantly over the past decade—partly due to China’s growing role in the region, but also because U.S. policymakers generally do not see the region as a priority—this change is barely reflected in the public debate, where the U.S. role remains outsized.
That often makes cooperating with the United States politically costly. When Brazil’s former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso reached, in 2000, a groundbreaking space cooperation deal with the United States, which would involve U.S. use of the Brazilian space agency’s launch site in Alcantara in Northern Brazil (its equatorial location allows reducing fuel costs of satellite launches by 30 percent), the opposition saw an opportunity to whip up anti-American nationalist sentiment by mischaracterizing the technology safeguards agreement (TSA) as a threat to Brazil’s sovereignty. Cardoso found himself accused of being an entreguista and canceled the project, which would have allowed Brazil to develop precious expertise in the area—increasingly important due to strong growth in the microsatellite sector crucial for GPS and internet communication. When the current government of Michel Temer took up the project recently, pressure again intensified, even though this time its successful conclusion is more likely. If the project partner had been China back then or today, it seems unlikely that the project would have faced as much political resistance.
This episode is starkly contrasted by how China can operate across Latin America and make strategic investments almost without any real concern for public opinion. When Chinese investors recently bought a third of Brazil’s electricity sector—a sector of tremendous strategic importance—the news barely made it to the front page of Brazilian newspapers. [br] In paragraph 3, the author mentions Chinese contemporary singer, athlete or soap opera star just in order to show that________.
选项
A、people in Latin America are aware of China’s growing economic role
B、people in Latin America are ignorant of China’s visibility
C、people in Latin America are not interested in Chinese culture
D、people in Latin America remain unknown to Chinese culture
答案
C
解析
细节题。根据题干关键词定位第3段第4句,可知大多数拉美人很难说出一个中国当代歌手、运动员或电视明星的名字,其原因在第3句:相比之下,中国文化往往不为人知,通常无人关注或难以引起人们的兴趣。故正确答案为C。
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